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*A Christian Journal of Opinion*  
PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION,  
EDUCATION

## AFRICA OF THE SIXTIES

*Bela Ige*

### Danger of Disillusionment

*by the Coordinator of President Kennedy's Task Force on Africa*

ROBERT C. GOOD

Missions in Transition . . . Theodore L. Tucker

Report on East Africa . . . Kenneth W. Thompson

"Shooting at Sharpeville" Arthur J. Moore, Jr.

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SPECIAL DOUBLE ISSUE

## ABOUT THIS ISSUE

*Each day's news reports from the Congo seem almost to contradict what we were told just 24 hours earlier. And so it is likely to continue. As much as we have considered the question of freedom and self-determination for all peoples since the end of World War II, it is clear that we were not prepared, and perhaps could not have been prepared, for what has happened in Africa during recent months.*

*We are called upon to make great readjust-*

*ments in our thinking and in our policy—to come to grips with a world that hardly seemed to exist yesterday. Unquestionably we are involved in this new world, but there is much understandable confusion regarding our role in it.*

*Because of the need for Americans to understand their role and responsibility in this situation, we publish this special double issue devoted entirely to African concerns.*

THE EDITORS

### Disappointed Hopes May Tempt Us to Abandon Africa

## The Danger of Disillusionment with Africa

ROBERT C. GOOD

WE ARE in danger of becoming disillusioned with Africa. Like the proper ladies of a recent cartoon, we thought we were attending a lecture on "African violets" and discovered to our dismay that the topic was really "African violence." If we are upset by our disappointed hopes, we will be tempted to wash our hands of Africa. This will be Africa's great loss, and our own.

Paradoxically, our trouble arises partly from our fine anti-colonial and liberal traditions. It was not very long ago that we placed unquestioning faith in those touchstones of the new age, self-determination and collective security. Self-determination would liquidate one of the chronic causes of war—the unfulfilled demand for independence on the part of subjugated nationalities. Collective security would assure stability for a self-determined world in which all would guarantee the right of each to its own independence.

We no longer suffer the illusions of liberal international political theory. But we are only beginning to realize that, far from a solution to the problems of disorder and far from the guarantor of amicable relations, the era of independence-for-everyone simply reshapes the frame within which the persistent problems of politics must be viewed.

Not understanding this, we may become, as Charles Burton Marshall has suggested, the victims of our own "revolution of rising expectations" concerning our relations with the new African

states. For deep down we hoped, and half expected, that once the hue and cry of the colonial revolt was past, we would be able to associate ourselves with democratic, Western-oriented African governments seeking their orderly development in relative concord with one another—an association free from the rigors of the cold war (for, after all, "there are no Communists in Africa") and free, too, from the constant embarrassment of compromise between colonial and anti-colonial interests that has characterized our Afro-Asia policy.

Regrettably, none of these expectations bears much relationship to reality. Our first responsibility, then, is to apprehend what is real—neither ignoring it nor excusing it, but understanding it. For disillusionment is the consequence of misunderstood facts and misplaced hopes. African actualities may be set forth in five propositions.

(1) *Most of the new African states will not be democratic, as we understand democracy; in general they will be one-party states.*

The trend in Africa is clearly toward regimes that either forbid an organized opposition or fetter the opposition sufficiently to make it politically meaningless. Sékou Touré of Guinea expresses this trend in its most radical form when he says: "The Government and the [National] Assembly are for nothing except to apply the decisions of the party."

Democracy is based upon meaningful restraints on the exercise of power. But the problem in many of the new African states is not to restrain power, but to accumulate sufficient power to make the government's writ effective across the land. Democ-

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rary presupposes countervailing power sufficient to bring the government to account in its management of the public's business. But in many African states, social and economic resources are too thin to provide for the construction of more than one pinnacle of power—that of the party and the government it controls.

It is loyalty to the ruling party that gives access to influence and wealth, quite unattainable in equal measure outside the party. In Senegal, a major oil company selected 27 of its brightest employees for executive training. Two years later all but two were in the Government.

Democracy demands a sense of the commonweal so compelling that the ruling elite and those who compete for leadership see themselves and each other as trustees of some larger interest than that of class or section. But the "opposition," such as it is, tends in many African states to express not national but tribal or sectional loyalties and interests. It is therefore condemned as unpatriotic or even subversive.

In short, autocracy in Africa is a response to the problem of building a nation. None of these states is founded on a deep, historical consciousness of nationhood; to the contrary, almost all are artificial creations of the colonial era and the personal loyalties of most individuals extend no farther than the tribe. Their countries have been recognized as independent national states abroad; leaders now must create viable national societies at home. To overcome parochialism, great stress is placed on the omnipresent legitimacy of the national party and on the person of the national leader.

(2) *Independent Africa will not evolve with orderly progress but, from time to time, will conjure up grave disorders and injustice.*

It is strange how naïve we are concerning the political dynamics of the new states. We are tempted to think that chaos in the Congo is a terrible mistake. That centralism in Guinea is the regrettable result of Communist subversion. That Nasserism is the unfortunate vainglory of one man.

The naïveté with which we approach the political realities of the new states is the consequence of the sublimated character of our own political processes. In developed Western countries, political competition is muffled by a long history, by long-established institutions, and by the gradual emergence of a large area of consensus concerning the rules of the game, the basic values underlying the political process, and procedures for arbitrating our most serious political cleavages.

Within the new states these sources of cohesion—history, institutions and agreement concerning the rules of the game—are minimal. Such as they are, they have begun to emerge only very recently under the tutelage of colonial rule, or still more recently in rebellion against colonial rule. Political power has been achieved first; the procedures and institutions necessary to make power compatible with justice and with the requirements of orderly change are still to be developed.

All this is only to say that the situation in many African states—the chaos of the Congo, the kidnapping of a government in Kivu Province, the extremes of strong-man rule and of what Mr. Nehru calls the "grave fissiparous tendencies" of the new states—are not the exception to the rule nor the aberration; often they *are* the rule, the reality. We ought not be quite so dismayed that this is the case.

More than eighty years after the Union was founded, the United States endured one of history's bloodiest wars in order to maintain an integrated political society. For all of its ancient institutions, its long history and its ardent nationalism, France continues to suffer from "grave fissiparous tendencies." And the most cursory review of political developments in Latin America over the past century ought to teach that the development of satisfactory political life is surrounded by vast difficulties.

Developing relations between the new African states do not augur well for stability either. We think of Africa too simply if we think only of

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Africa "aspiring to be free." For most African leaders, what counts is how freedom will be used to reconstruct Africa. To this end, there are about as many plans as there are leaders. Increasingly, Africa's turbulence will arise, not from the struggle against a declining foreign order, but from the clash of competing African conceptions of Africa's future.

We had a vivid example of this clash a few weeks ago. Early in January, five African neutralist states met in Casablanca. They gave strong support to Lumumba, proclaimed their distrust of de Gaulle's policy in Algeria and denounced Mauritania as a French "puppet state." Three of the five, meeting later in the capital of Guinea, condemned "all regroupings of African states based on the languages of colonial states."

Only a few days before, however, just such a grouping had convened in Brazzaville. There the leaders of twelve French-speaking African states acknowledged the legitimacy of the Kasavubu government, indicated their confidence in de Gaulle's Algerian policy and agreed to press for Mauritanian membership in the UN.

(3) *Most of the new African governments will not be Western-oriented; they will be neutralist—some with a pro-East slant.*

There are exceptions to the neutralist mood of emergent Africa. But they are giving ground rapidly. Not long ago it was expected that Nigeria would be tied closely to the West. It is now clear that Nigeria will tolerate no strings to its independence. The statesmen of former French Africa who praised French liberality at the UN last fall were speaking with deep sincerity. But the fact that each of these states opted for independence from France indicates the swiftness of the tidal flow in Africa and the pull it exerts, through the young radicals in each regime, on those in control.

The rising tide is that of Africanism—not French Africanism, nor British, nor least of all "Western"—but a fixation on the future as Africa's future and a reconstruction of the past as Africa's past.

Just as important, there is, one suspects, an unexpressed conviction among many African leaders that Africa can be held erect as an independent area only if it can skillfully balance the pressures of both East and West. We may deplore the opportunities in this situation for international blackmail. But these opportunities are built-in; we had better get used to them.

From the point of view of these relatively impotent countries, however, this is not blackmail. It

is the equally ancient but more honorable art of maintaining political equilibrium. If you are almost totally dependent on the outside world for your expertise, your capital, your education (the list is endless), you had better diversify your dependence sufficiently so that there will always be an "alternative" should the influence of one side or the other become too imposing.

For some leftist governments, like that of Ghana, "positive neutralism" sometimes is interpreted as a rather silly, not to say dangerous, mathematical balance between East and West. If 3,000 Ghanaian students attend Western universities, Kwame Nkrumah observed the other day, we must send 3,000 to the East.

But the trend is not limited to radical governments. In Morocco, the left-wing government of Abdullah Ibrahim was ousted by royal fiat last spring and the conservative Crown Prince Moulay Hassan was invested with governmental authority. Yet, paradoxically, conservative Morocco has continued to move to the left in foreign policy, partly to contain its dissident radical opposition, but also to pursue the first requirement for independence—neutralism based on an attempt to balance the preponderant dependence on France by expanding trade, aid and diplomatic ties with the East.

(4) *The collapse of colonialism in Africa will not release us from embarrassing political choices; it will only change the form of these choices.*

We have often assumed that our chronic embarrassment, standing as we have between the colonialism of Europe and the anti-colonialism of Afro-Asia, will disappear as the colonial system is dismantled. Once Europe is out of Africa, we thought, we will be able to support African aspirations without having to worry about our relations with our allies. We will have a *real* African policy, uncompromised by "colonial thinking." But history seldom comes wrapped in such neat parcels.

Conflicts of interest between the former metropole and its former colonies do not conveniently terminate with independence. There are cases in which they get worse. And frequently we are confronted with the agony of choice. When Tunisia's Bourguiba, over French protests, asked for small arms from Britain and the US, we could not please both France and Tunisia. We chose the latter. When the issue of Mauritania's admission to the UN split France and Morocco, we could not satisfy both. We chose quite correctly to back Mauritania, thereby supporting France and slighting Morocco.

Nor with independence do the legitimate inter-

ests of our European allies automatically terminate in their former colonies. Belgium, for example, has very real interests in Moise Tshombe's Katanga as does France in President Ahidjo's Cameroun Republic. In contemporary African politics, both are controversial governments. Our policies respecting them must weigh with care the conflicting views of a variety of states with which we wish to maintain good relations. Again, the end of colonialism brings no escape from politics, the very essence of which is choice in situations where one confronts incompatible demands.

Incompatible demands are arising also from political issues indigenous to Africa. Whenever possible, we should refrain from taking sides in Africa's struggle to define its own destiny. But occasions will arise when we shall not be able to remain aloof. We shall have to take sides. That time is now upon us in the Congo.

(5) *In Africa we face not an escape from the rigors of the cold war, but competition on a new front.*

Despite African protests to the contrary, the cold war is in Africa and cannot now be exorcised from Africa. East and West are competing vigorously for the friendship of the continent.

In this competition, the West enjoys some obvious advantages. Most African governments are receiving important aid from the West: expatriate civil servants for their bureaucracies, education for their cadres, loans and technical assistance for their development programs, training and weapons for their armies.

But there are serious disadvantages for the West and we might as well be fully aware of them. First, Africa has won, or is in the act of winning, emancipation from Western, not Soviet, imperial rule. Western imperialism is a part of Africa's experience; Soviet imperialism is only a part of an hypothesis. Moreover, the Communist bloc has been an ally in the task of dismantling colonialism in Africa. Second, the Communists offer models for development and political integration that appear to be much more relevant to African needs than the opulent and libertarian societies of the West. The example of disciplined, austere, bootstrap-lifting Red China is more and more frequently invoked by many African leaders. Third, Africans want to give tangible evidence that they are in fact independent; there is a natural inclination to do so by opposing positions taken by those Western powers to whom they were so long subservient.

Finally, there is a natural concurrence of inter-

ests between the more "radical" African regimes and the Communist bloc. Neither endorses the *status quo*; both seek to disrupt existing relationships between Africa and Europe. The radical African regimes—Ghana, Guinea and Mali, for example—want to reduce Europe's influence in Africa to a minimum and, as quickly as possible, to transform existing political units into a true pan-African state. The Communists naturally support any move designed to undo Europe's position and enthusiastically support the centralist, socialist, pan-Africanist objectives of the radical regimes.

Similarly, there is a natural concurrence of interests between the more "conservative" regimes and the West; both want to maintain the stability of the present system. This is particularly true of France, which is closely identified with the more conservative regimes of its former colonies. Thus, intra-African disputes, as in the case of the Congo, are likely to polarize into "radical" and "conservative" positions, with Communist bloc and Western involvement an ever-present danger.

In a continent as vast and volatile as Africa, any generalization will be challenged, and exceptions are almost as easy to produce as the "rules" themselves. Thus the outlook for democratic institutions is much brighter in federated Nigeria than in unitary Ghana. The road to pan-African cooperation may not be nearly as rough in East Africa (Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda) as in West Africa. Prospects for stability in Guinea and Ghana are vastly greater than in the Congo.

Yet the generalizations reviewed above represent trends that will be ignored only at the risk of serious disillusionment. They should, above all, instruct us to be sober in defining our expectations for Africa. But under no circumstances should they prompt defeatism. We may not like the trend toward autocracy in many new African states, but we ought to be realistic enough to understand that, excessive though it will be in many cases, state centralism is a response to the very real problem of developing the requisites of order and progress in fragmented, traditional societies.

We may be offended at the gauche and sometimes irresponsible neutralism of the new Africa. But, removed from the periphery of the Communist bloc, Africa does not present the same security problems as most areas in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. A neutralist Africa is not imical to our interests.

We may be alarmed, and properly so, at the leverage the Communist bloc is developing on many of the more radical African states. But Afri-

can radicals, with only a very few exceptions, are not Communists. Even those who call themselves Marxists see their future not in terms of a Communist order, but in terms of an African order.

We will be required time and again to weigh our obligations to Europe against our obligations to Africa, and our interests in one bloc of African states against our interests in an opposing bloc. Whenever possible we must avoid intervention in purely African struggles, leaving to Africans the responsibility of putting their own house in order.

Using the UN and other channels, we must work to prevent the partition of the continent into rival spheres of the great powers. But Soviet adventurism combined with the reckless ambitions or the revolutionary fervor (the two are hard to distinguish) of some African states may create situations in which we are required to intervene. When such occasions arise, it is fatuous to suppose we will be able to support all factions all the time.

Independent Africa is irrevocably entering the international political arena. It cannot remain isolated from the forces that agitate the world, nor can we from the forces that agitate Africa.

Still, it is not a contradiction to insist that our guiding principle must be to maintain access to all of Africa. It would be tragically premature if we were to write off this or that state, particularly during this period when more and more Africans are reacting emotionally to colonialism and to the West, and are determined to experiment with a variety of political, economic and social forms. In extreme cases, "access" may mean nothing more than a holding operation against a future when relations may be improved. But I am inclined to think that, given the potentialities of our aid programs and the possibilities inherent in imaginative diplomacy, the opportunities everywhere in Africa are much broader.

## SPECIAL REPORT

### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA

*Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika*

The struggle for independence, representative government, and political and economic development in East Africa is fraught with local and worldwide consequences. In each country or region, efforts to create social institutions based on majority rule but respecting minority interests will determine whether Africans, Asians and Europeans can live in harmony while seeking to advance their common interests.

In the world setting, events in East Africa will demonstrate the possibility of an alternative to the tragic pattern of the Congo. Some observers predict that Africa may have from three to five years to evolve viable institutions before international communism threatens the area. If present nationalist leaders and European officials fail in their task, those forces that thrive on chaos and confusion will almost surely benefit.

No two countries or territories present the same issues or challenges, for political development has proceeded at an uneven pace throughout the region, which includes Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda.

Politically, Tanganyika is an island in a sea of troubles. It has succeeded in bringing into being the rudiments of free government while others have been suffering birth pangs. Tanganyika is only beginning to face its economic difficulties, but it has several favorable assets—a most effective and respected African leader in Julius Nyerere, a responsible African political party, African ministers at work on problems of housing, local government and education, and cooperative relations between white administrators and Africans. Moreover, Tanganyika has no white settler problem, nor is it threatened by tribal rivalries. Its unification was assured in part by the harsh rule of the Germans at the beginning of the 20th century (120,000 Africans were killed in 1905 in an ill-fated and premature revolt) and by the subsequent rule of the British, who laid the foundations for law and order.

The rallying point for Tanganyika therefore became not persecution by alien rulers but the right of self-government. Nyerere became the spokesman for self-rule; he launched a campaign for self-determination and organized a political party named the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). When Africans warned that any movement for self-rule would be stamped out and thousands would meet the fate of the Mau Mau or those who failed to overthrow German rule in 1905, Nyerere was able to point to the recommendations of a United Nations mission sent out in September 1955, two months after the formation of TANU. He could cite the mission's conclusion that Tanganyika need not wait twenty years for independence but could move more promptly toward this goal. Fifty-eight thousand people were qualified for the vote, and posts from that of Chief Minister, which Nyerere occupies, on down could begin to be filled by Africans.

While Tanganyika has a firm grip on its political problems and its methods have succeeded, it still

runs the risk of being isolated from the rest of the continent. Extreme nationalist leaders elsewhere resent its peaceful evolution and well-publicized success. They are suspicious of a movement that has gone ahead in the measured terms of social evolution. They call for more strident nationalism.

Moreover, the problems of Kenya and Uganda, to say nothing of the difficulties in Central Africa, are more severe. Uganda is harrassed by tribalism. The most advanced and progressive tribal group, the Buganda, with its own administrative, social and political institutions, calls for autonomy within East Africa. Indeed, some young Africans insist that a larger union or confederation in the area must be based not on the present British territories but on the more ancient tribal structures. Tribalism vies with nationalism, sectionalism with regionalism as the organizing principle of the area.

Nonetheless, the Democratic Party promises to gain 40 of the 70 seats in the legislative council in Uganda and may succeed in giving reasonably effective political leadership. The Kenya African Nationalist Union, with outspoken leaders like Tom Mboya and moderate spokesmen like Dr. G. Kiano,

promises to become the majority party in Kenya. As in other under-developed areas, a single political party will probably be the means of establishing political order. Justice will depend on the wisdom of its leaders and the vitality of political debate inside and outside the party.

If an East African Federation is to emerge, it will come gradually through the workings of common institutions and not through a single constitutional act coinciding with the independence of the three territories. Enlightened African leaders hope to keep as many as possible of the common services on an inter-regional basis after independence. These include a University of East Africa, a customs union, a common currency, the East African Airways and an inter-territorial railway system. These could be the nuclei of emerging unity. But the forces of separation are also strong even within the University, with its separate faculties at Kampala, Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.

Yet East Africa has a fighting chance to develop an alternative pattern to that of the Congo. It deserves the goodwill of free men everywhere as it pursues this goal.

K.W.T.

#### A Young Nigerian Christian Speaks his Mind on African Nationalism

## Africa of the Sixties\*

'BOLA IGE

THE 15TH session of the United Nations will be memorable for many things.

Premier Khrushchev stormed and pounded, but it was really the invasion of the organization's chambers by black faces that was most significant. Whereas five years ago there were only four African member states (including South Africa, if Dr. Verwoerd doesn't mind) in the UN, there are now 25, 16 of them admitted this year. Some people still cannot believe that it is true. But no one can be called a rabid or starry-eyed nationalist if he reiterates that it is not sufficient that two-thirds of Africa should be free; every inch must be free before the Sixties run out. The wind of change cannot be deflected.

Nevertheless, this is 1960, in a world where no nation can isolate itself. Into this complex and exacting world of competing powers jump these African nations, many of them economically poor

and technologically backward. Political independence is only minimum elbow-room which our countries need to develop their human and material resources; it is only by starting in this political area that we can recapture something authentic of ourselves, purge ourselves of those built-in systems that almost made robots of us, and thus emerge as new personalities.

The Congo debacle will not be the last of our problems; for, unhappily, we shall not be allowed to create our own problems, nor solve them ourselves. We are now compelled to fight and defeat hydra-headed political and socio-economic monsters, we who have neither perfectly learned the use of our brothers' weapons nor been allowed to fashion our own. It is a bewildering and terrifying situation. And yet it offers challenge and hope. If we fail, we shall have only ourselves to blame, and that is better than to be benevolently "guided" by colonial masters.

MR. IGE is a Nigerian lawyer. As Co-Secretary for the 18th Ecumenical Student Conference of the National Student Christian Federation, he traveled widely in the United States making speeches and visiting numerous campuses.

\*Reprinted from the January 1961 issue of *Federation News* of the World Student Christian Federation.

Two-thirds of Africa is now free, but in few places is this freedom being spelled out in the lives of the people. We are economically underdeveloped; we have masses of illiterate, diseased and undernourished peoples, and we cannot any longer tolerate the "exoticism that hides from unaware eyes" the misery of our people. For the superficial prosperity of Nigerians and Ghanaians is not the whole truth; nor is the new class, the *nouveaux riches*, the "black bourgeoisie" (to borrow a phrase from the American scholar, Franklin Frazier), the true Africa. Africa is the simple humble people who are in many places paternalistically and fondly treated because of their election votes, and then left just a little better off. Except in a few of the new states, most of our African leaders are right of center, even by Western European standards.

They are a curious breed, our new leaders. Not many of them have had to make great personal sacrifices for independence. They have replaced our former colonial masters, and have vast government funds at their disposal for social welfare schemes. Parliamentary and semi-parliamentary forms of government have been set up very much like prefabricated buildings. And, thanks to the United States and the Soviet Union, there is opportunity for them to indulge in politico-economic harlotry.

### The Issues

The 1960's will present Africa with many issues. We have to walk a tightrope, encouraging and participating in nationalist revolts of our still unfree brothers, on the one hand, and maintaining friendly relationships with the governments that still hold colonies down, on the other. To be specific, how can the African countries that are politically and culturally linked with France be both anti-colonial and pro-France vis-a-vis Algeria; how can Ghanaians and Nigerians, especially the latter, desire to be "eternally bound" with Great Britain and the West, while at the same time they supply money and beam nationalist broadcasts to the oppressed Africans of East and Central Africa?

In dealing with our own internal problems, what have we to offer to our own people in the way of a high standard of living? How can our people really taste and enjoy being free men? How are we to counter the disturbing pessimism and cynicism to be found among many young educated Africans so soon after independence? Let no one be mistaken: these young men will join their leaders, however reactionary they may be, in the fight against any interference with their nation's inde-

pendence. Their impatience is with much of the present dispensation, which appears to them like a fraud and which seems incapable of raising up the *whole* society at once.

Pan-Africanism provides a rallying cry for those with many motives, but more than anything else, it expresses a desire for something not as superficial, vague and confusing as much of our life is today. It is a quest for something authentic and distinctive, a new personality. Voices are being raised; many more will be raised in the coming years. A young Nigerian poetess, Mabel Imoukhueme, writes:

*Here we stand  
infants overblown,  
poised between two civilizations,  
finding the balance irksome,  
itching for something to happen,  
to tip us one way or the other,  
groping in the dark for a helping hand—  
and finding none.  
I'm tired, O my God, I'm tired,  
I'm tired of hanging in the middle way—  
But where can I go?*

I have an answer, but that is not the point now.

The "two civilizations" of which she speaks are not necessarily Western (European) and African; rather they are two somewhat "unknown" yet palpable systems in which we of the new nations live. And I would venture to say that as long as we do not commit ourselves to something that will turn us inside out, for good or for ill, so long will we be neutralized.

In another context, Africans may have to hear a great exhortation in these words of a young Senegalese nationalist, David Diop:

*You who stop, you who weep,  
You who one day die without knowing why,  
You who fight, who watch while another sleeps;  
You who no longer laugh with your eyes,  
You, my brother, full of fear and anguish,  
Raise yourself and cry no!*

The battle over the African personality is now being waged mainly along political lines. Probably this is because politics is the one thing we today know well enough. However, the struggle is also going on, though rather insignificantly, in other areas. There is the vast problem of Africans coming to know one another better; the average Liberian probably knows more about the United States than about his neighbor, the Republic of Ivory Coast, to say nothing of the determined young Socialist Republic of Guinea. Between Dr. Nkrumah and President Sékou Touré there still has to be an interpreter; the same is true for President Nasser and Premier Patrice Lumumba.

We are, to say the least, "culturally balkanized." One looks almost in vain for serious efforts to create a sustaining ethos among our peoples. And yet no political union or *entente* can succeed without an ingrained sense of loyalty to that indefinable something that keeps peoples together.

Do not think that there are no fears about the ultimate end of the "personality." It is true that we ourselves do not know *exactly* what we mean by this magic word; it has something of "negritude" in it, but as the English meaning and undertones have obscured the French interpretation of the word, we no longer use it. We may have been victims of white racialists, but we cannot afford to be racialists ourselves, politically or culturally. We also mean a reinterpretation and a new pride in our indigenous cultures, but we certainly do not wish to be immobilized by exhortations to look only on our ancient grandeur. In a world that is becoming techno-cultural, we wonder whether we should bother to preserve anything of our much maligned cultures. Why not accept the future and only that?

### A Struggle for Africans Alone

Having sketched some of our problems, I want, at the risk of seeming arrogant, to give my considered opinion that the struggle for our full freedom, freedom in every way, and especially for the poorest peasant farmer, has to be waged by us Africans alone. I realize that no nation, no people, can easily be isolationist in these days; but I wish to emphasize that it is not the evil intentions of those who encompass us that can harm us, but rather the good intentions of those who woo us.

We definitely are not self-sufficient, nor shall we be for some time to come, but are we not in danger of looking on foreign aid as the panacea to our problems? What about encouraging our people to work hard, very hard, even if this necessitates firm handling? And do we not owe our foreign benefactors a responsibility not to be parasites? At the risk of being misunderstood, ought we not to pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps, unless we are just not able to do so?

This is a matter that concerns the scores of thousands of Africans who are presently studying abroad. If these qualified youths do not find jobs simply because our development is allowed to depend largely on the largesse of outsiders, rather than on the bold imaginativeness of our own political leaders, chaos may lie in the not too distant future.

In conclusion, I cannot do better than quote a section from the speech of President Sekou Touré of Guinea to the UN in 1959. It may rightly be described as a manifesto for Pan-Africanism.

For the emancipation of Africa, we have chosen liberty and democracy, popular and dynamic action, the use of all our resources, of all our means, the assistance of all systems, the help of all peoples, the contribution of all, the teachings of every experiment, the lessons of all techniques, in one word, the fruits, all the fruits of the world, to which we would like to add our own fruits.

It appears to me that these things needed to be said here, with frankness and courage, in order to have it understood by all people that Africa must and will find its own paths of development towards full emancipation. For there is no people, no nation, no group of nations which have found themselves in the same historical, geographic or human conditions, absolutely identical with those of Africa, and which therefore could effectively pretend to show it the path which it should take.

Populations include more than eighty per cent of illiterate peasants, with an annual individual income of less than \$100, and, therefore, with the most precarious conditions of life—these are the harsh realities of Africa, when it is no longer masked behind the ridiculous veil of exoticism which hides from unaware eyes the colossal misery of our vast under-developed countries, at present sparsely populated because of centuries of slavery.

And yet in this poverty, of which humanity should be ashamed, there is man, with his invincible faith in the destiny of humanity; there is his hope, his determination, to win and to grow; his immense thirst for brotherhood and harmony; his kindness still in its purest form; and at the same time, his extraordinary energy and sharp sense of responsibility. There is also the incalculable amount of virtues and values of almost two hundred million Africans, the tremendous possibility which this represents, and the intellectual potential which this may be.

Should we not affirm here that, conscious of the importance of its contribution to the moral and material happiness of the world, Africa prefers cooperation and fraternity to charity?

We can consider that until humanity will have incorporated this immense mass of proletarian peoples into the life of the universe, the family of mankind will be incomplete, and not sure of reaching its ultimate perfection in unity, progress and liberty.

Sekou Touré does not hide that he is a Marxist Socialist. It would be good to hear the response of young African Christians to that statement.

## Our Faltering UN Strategy on Africa

**GEORGE M. HOUSER**

THE IMPORTANCE of Africa in world affairs was never so obvious as now. The Congo crisis not only threatens to become a large-scale civil war fought out in the heart of Africa, but also threatens to involve international forces in the most serious way. At the moment of writing the United States and the Soviet Union are backing opposing regimes in the Congo. The African states are not united and are supporting one or another of the contending factions in the Congo. It is not unlikely that the Congo may be split into at least two divisions —one side backed by the East and the other by the West. The very life, or at least the effectiveness, of the United Nations is at stake.

It is rather ironic that a crisis of this character should develop at the center of the African continent. Virtually all of the African states are honestly committed to a policy of neutralism in the cold war. Furthermore, the African states know that they genuinely need the protection of the United Nations. It is unfortunate that newly emerging Africa should have been drawn so completely into the realities of the cold war so soon.

But quite apart from the Congo crisis, Africa is bound to have a tremendous importance on the world scene. Africa is the second largest continent. It has vast resources that have only begun to be tapped. It has a strategic location looking out to the Atlantic on the west, the Mediterranean on the north, and the Indian Ocean on the east. Africa already has 25 member states in the UN with considerably more to come in the next few years.

All of this makes it only too obvious that the United States needs the friendship of Africa. This would be true even if there were no cold war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Friendship between peoples is essential for the values that are inherently involved. But the existence of cold war competition makes friendship between the United States and the people of Africa that much more urgent. It is therefore most appropriate at this time, when a new Administration is taking the controls of government, that past policies of the United States toward Africa be assessed and prospects for new policies be examined.

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One UN official remarked to me recently that the Eisenhower administration was making it relatively easy for President Kennedy to appear in a good light so far as US policy toward Africa is concerned. "American prestige is so low because of recent policies," he said, "that there is no place to go but up." In a straw vote taken by a group of African political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia before last fall's Presidential elections, Kennedy won all but one vote. Perhaps this is symbolic of the fact that most Africans have looked with some hope to a change of American administrations.

The loss of American prestige in the Afro-Asian world towards the end of 1960 was attributable primarily to the actions of the United States during the first portion of the 15th session of the United Nations General Assembly. On one issue after another of vital importance to the African people, the US either abstained or voted along with the colonial powers. The cumulative effect of this was such that towards the end of the Assembly in December it was not unusual to have delegates representing countries most friendly to the United States make statements such as this one made to me by a Tunisian: "Those of us who have been friends of the United States are almost ashamed of that fact now. It is detrimental to our position at the UN for our representatives to be seen too frequently talking with members of the United States delegation."

### Injurious Abstentions

First and perhaps symbolically most important in this loss of American prestige was the United States' abstention on the so-called "anti-colonialism" resolution. This resolution, sponsored by a group of Afro-Asian countries, proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end, colonialism in all of its forms and manifestations." It was passed with no negative votes and with nine abstentions. It is interesting to note the countries that joined the United States in abstaining. They were Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, Australia and the Dominican Republic.

The full tragedy of the United States' abstention can be understood only when it is realized that a resolution sponsored by the Soviet calling for the

end of colonialism by 1961 was defeated, and the Afro-Asian countries had sponsored the resolution that succeeded because they hoped it would receive unanimous support. Ambassador Wadsworth's explanation of the United States' vote fell on rather deaf ears. "I should like to say, however, that I am sure that the devotion of the United States to the principles of human freedom and political advancement will be judged by what the United States has done, is doing and will continue to do in the cause of freedom."

A second crucial vote that injured American prestige was the abstention on the Algerian resolution. The form in which the resolution finally passed the General Assembly, by a vote of 63 in favor to 8 against with 27 abstentions, simply recognized the responsibility of the United Nations to help promote self-determination for Algeria, a position that President de Gaulle himself supported. The United States had voted against a stronger resolution that had asked for a UN-sponsored referendum in Algeria, a resolution that received a majority vote but not the necessary two-thirds. Our abstention on the Algerian resolution was disappointing to the African states because it had been hoped that the US, with recognition of the obvious inevitability that Algeria would become independent soon, would find it possible to follow an independent line and not adhere just to the position that France would impose upon her.

A third vote that was a black mark on the American record from an African point of view was the abstention on the resolution calling upon Portugal to submit reports to the UN on conditions in her various overseas territories. Portugal has insisted that these territories, the largest of which are in Africa, are really overseas provinces. But the UN, through this resolution, specifically called the territories non-self-governing and insisted that Portugal was obligated to issue reports to the General Assembly.

Heretofore the US has claimed that any country alone has the right to decide whether it has any non-self-governing territories. This time we did not press this point because of the intensity of the feeling among African and Asian countries; we simply abstained, joined by a sprinkling of Latin American countries and some Western European countries. Most of the so-called colonial powers voted against the resolution. This vote takes on significance when it is realized that Portuguese territories not only are about the last bastion of old-time colonialism in Africa, but that the conditions in such territories as Angola and Mozambique are

generally thought to be the worst in Africa.

Fourth, added to this unfortunate abstention on the question of Portugal's transmitting information about her territories was the fact that the US supported Portugal for one of the vacant non-permanent seats on the Security Council. In supporting Portugal we were simply carrying out a commitment of many years' standing to vote for a seat reserved for a Western European country to be nominated by the Western European countries themselves. But it is difficult to understand what might have caused the Western European countries, in this year above all, to have nominated Portugal for a vacancy in the Security Council when it was known how embittered the African and Asian countries were against Portugal for her defiance of the United Nations Charter.

To make matters even worse, however, the US supported Portugal against Liberia, our oldest ally in Africa, which had been nominated by the Afro-Asian states in opposition to Portugal. It is true that Portugal finally had to be withdrawn, and the United States supported a compromise plan by which Liberia and Ireland split between them the two-year term on the Security Council. But the damage was already done.

### The New Administration

A fifth vote that hurt the United States was the seating of the Kasavubu delegation as the recognized spokesman in the UN for the newly independent but troubled Republic of the Congo. Perhaps it was not just the fact that the United States supported the Kasavubu delegation as such that did so much damage, because the African states were split among themselves as to which Congo faction should be recognized. Rather it was the fact that the United States gave such vigorous leadership to this campaign and exhibited no similarly intense interest on any other issue relating to Africa. The African delegations were probably correct in assuming that the US worked so diligently on this particular issue not so much out of concern for the future of the Congo as for her own cold war interests. Many delegations felt it would have been much better if the United States, instead of pushing the question, had delayed until the UN Conciliation Commission had been able to report back after its investigation in the Congo and until the internal situation had clarified itself a bit more.

Although other US strategies and votes during the first portion of the 15th session of the General Assembly helped to damage American prestige in

the eyes of the Africans and Asians, these were the most important. The question now, of course, is whether the Kennedy administration can change the climate of opinion about the United States.

Although the new Administration has now been in office for something over a month, it is still early to make any assessment about US policy and what its effect will be among African and Asian countries. Nevertheless, from President Kennedy's inaugural address and other statements he has made, and from the statements made by Secretary of State Rusk and Ambassador Stevenson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there are some indications of the general approach of the new Administration — and the direction indicated offers some hope.

For one thing, the new Administration reflects a positive attitude toward the emergence of new states. Mr. Stevenson put it this way: "The drives of self-expression and self-government are what make the free world hum." Secretary Rusk observed that the United States has not adequately kept up its contact with various national movements, and he said this with the implication that the new Administration would do all it could to make these contacts more effectively in the future.

Second, the new Administration reflects a respect for neutralism among various small states. In his inaugural address, President Kennedy said, "We shall not always expect to find them supporting our views." Then he added that he "always hoped to find them supporting their own freedom."

Third, and also in his inaugural address, the President announced a firm intention of giving assistance to people around the globe "struggling to break the bonds of mass misery." He went on to say that he pledged "our best efforts to help them to help themselves, not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right." This is a pronouncement that the African countries cannot help but applaud.

And fourth, the new Administration has recognized the necessity for the US to give leadership to the peoples who are breaking the bonds of colonial rule. Secretary Rusk recently said: "I do believe that other countries have been looking to us for leadership in a variety of directions and we need to exert that leadership more vigorously." In the few days that the new Administration has been tackling some of the questions arising at the UN, particularly the Congo issue, it is obvious that it is attempting to implement this principle of giving leadership.

If the United States is to be successful in chang-

ing the image it has created in the eyes of the peoples of Africa and Asia in recent years, it seems to me that at least three policies must be vigorously implemented. First and foremost, the US must without delay initiate a dynamic policy in relation to the world-wide struggle for independence and equality. It is true that the US in the past has enunciated fine statements of sentiment favoring the right of self-determination and equality of peoples. But, as in the last session of the General Assembly, we have been found wanting when there was a concrete opportunity to implement the general statement of policy. I remember vividly what the present Prime Minister of the newly independent Republic of Togo in West Africa said to me when he came to the United States after he had, almost overnight, catapulted into the leadership of his country: "After we are independent everyone is our friend. But our true friends are those who supported us when we were struggling for our freedom."

The United States has done very little to win the friendship and the support of what will soon be independent Algeria during its days of travail. Why should the people of Algeria look with confidence to U.S. now that their struggle is drawing to a close? But we still have some time and still have the opportunity of winning the confidence of the people of Portuguese Africa and of the majority of the people, the non-whites, in the Union of South Africa, whose national revolution still lies ahead. These two issues are perhaps the last opportunity the US will have to prove by action that the American people support others around the world in their struggle for freedom.

In a real sense the United States has never developed an independent African policy. The US position has always been Europe-oriented. But the good will of the people of Africa cannot be won by a policy that is oriented toward maintaining the *status quo* for a dictatorial regime in Portugal that exploits the great mass of Africans in Angola and Mozambique, nor by general tolerance towards an exploitative white-supremacist government in the Union of South Africa.

Is the United States really capable of taking an independent line towards the national revolutions that lie just ahead in South Africa and in the Portuguese territories? If not, the United States cannot look forward to giving leadership to the vast majority of the people in these areas in the years ahead. The United States must now recognize the real dynamics of the national revolutions that are taking place and mold relevant policies.

Second, if the United States is to win the confidence of the newly independent countries, it must genuinely respect their neutralism. Americans tend to panic as they see the Soviet Government making advances in various parts of Africa. There is the too rapid assumption that if an African government accepts a loan or other aid from the Soviet Union this country is lost to communism. Few things have hurt American prestige so much in Ghana, for example, as the unfortunate statement made by former Secretary of State Herter last fall when he said that Ghana was playing the Communist's game.

Americans should remember that the Soviet Union has started from scratch in Africa. It has only been within the last two or three years that the Soviet Union has been able to establish any direct relations with the peoples and the governments of Africa. While Africa was under colonial rule the Soviet Government was not permitted any relationship. Soviet contacts in Africa therefore seem spectacular, because they have all come within the space of the last couple of years.

If the United States wishes to compete successfully with the Soviet Union in Africa, it must recognize the genuine right of the African countries to international independence. It must implement its anti-colonial preachers, and it must carry on a policy that is not always and obviously based on cold war strategy. It must implement President Kennedy's inauguration pledges to help them help themselves.

Third, the program of the United States to give assistance to the African and underdeveloped countries must be speeded up tremendously. This means an enlarged program of technical assistance, of loans, of investments, of crash programs for student scholarships, implementation of the Peace Corps idea, etc. This kind of aid and assistance, however, cannot be used just as a weapon in winning a cold war competition. It cannot be used just to aid those who are obviously our good friends and supporters and to hinder the growth of those who are critical of US policies. The program will be looked upon with suspicion by most countries of Africa if offers are not made to assist all people in achieving modern educational standards and modern economic conditions. And it must be borne very carefully in mind that this kind of program in and of itself cannot succeed unless it is combined with a program of understanding of and sympathy with the people who are responding to the dynamics of change throughout the world.

# WORLD CHURCH

## MISSIONS IN TRANSITION

Theodore L. Tucker

The aim of Christian Missions in Africa has often been defined as the building up of indigenous churches that will be self-propagating, self-governing and self-supporting. How far have these aims been achieved?

South of the Sahara considerable numerical success has come. The number of missionaries from Europe and North America has always been comparatively small, with just a handful of others from Asia, Australasia and Brazil. That probably over forty million Africans claim to be in some sense members of the Christian community is largely due to Africans themselves, who have heard the good news and passed it on. Missionaries have worked hard, but it was their pupils who took the Word out into Africa's hundreds of villages. The delegates to the first All-Africa Church Conference rightly said in their message to the churches of Africa:

We thank God for the way that the Gospel has been brought to so many countries and are filled with astonished joy that it has transformed the lives of so many men and women of Africa!

In a continent where such massive events lie ahead, we thank God that the Christian Church has taken such deep root. We know that there are millions who have not heard the Gospel, and we accept the challenge of the evangelizing of our countries.

Churches have been growing in Africa, and in fact reports from some parts of Congo, show that 1960 brought greater increases of adult baptisms than ever before. This is not to deny that there are areas of standstill, even of recession, but one main reason for hope in Africa is that the churches have been self-propagating. The absence of missionaries, therefore, would not necessarily be fatal.

Despite these hopeful signs, the Church in Africa is still decidedly a minority, even in the rural areas where it is strongest. The growth of cities and the flocking of young people to town demands new ministries and new patterns of life. Training in Christian citizenship and the building of new community life is urgently needed.

It is significant that the All-Africa Church Conference took place in January 1958, before the Independent African States' Conference of April and the All-Africa People's Conference of December 1958. Within the churches there had been a steady drive towards self-government, which was of course reinforced by what was happening in the political sphere. The era of missionary paternalism was largely over. Most of the major mission boards were already cooperating with autonomous

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churches before the events of 1960, and usually workers from overseas were assigned duties by the churches. Return to the field after furlough was already only at the invitation of the African church, whether in Sierra Leone or Ghana, Angola or Rhodesia, Congo or Cameroun.

In many areas the mission had already been integrated in the church. The transition had been made from mission domination to African control. Several African Churches are now members of the World Council, and rejoice in their new status of sister, rather than daughter, churches. At the same time, these self-governing churches have not been slow to invite Christians from other lands to work with them. Indeed, the assumption of administrative direction by Africans should potentially allow missionaries to exercise the specialized ministries for which they have been called and result in even more fruitful relationships. If political obstacles do not supervene there should be opportunities for both long-term and short-term fellow workers from overseas.

Within the autonomous churches the dearth of African leadership is widely recognized. At a time when well-trained African doctors and teachers are becoming more numerous, too few gifted candidates for the ministry offer themselves because the Church's task is not challengingly presented to students. Inadequate provision has been made for ministerial training. There have been too-many, isolated, small-scale schools, with few students and overworked staffs, who often have followed non-African patterns and have not been able to grapple with present-day challenges to the faith. The importance of the International Missionary Council's initiative in creating a Theological Education Fund, which has been making its first efforts in bringing about ministerial training at college level in Africa, cannot be overstressed. Self-governing churches certainly need well-trained leaders.

In many parts of Africa the Church has made a notable record in self-support, covering all its own expenses and carrying on home mission work. However, use has often been made of flat-rate contributions of so much per church member, and the development of a real sense of proportionate stewardship is evident only in some areas. In the rural areas reliance will still be placed largely on laymen working under superiors, but in the cities full time pastors, sufficiently well trained to minister to well-educated laymen and to enlist them in the work of the church, are needed. The support of these ministers should come from local sources, for mission boards have found how difficult it is to subsidize the support of the ministry without sapping self-respect. The giving and receiving of aid is, of course, one of the most difficult of tasks.

Events of the past year have shown that Africans are determined to be rid of colonialism. Missions must certainly be freed of any remaining vestiges of paternalism in their relations with African churches, or any apparent support of remaining colonial regimes. Only then can we become partners in obedience to God's will.

## BOOKS

### THE SHARPEVILLE STORY

Arthur J. Moore, Jr.

Recent turmoil in Congo and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has temporarily diverted attention from the Union of South Africa, that defiant stronghold of the white man's Africa. Indeed, events in the Republic of Congo and its warring parts have undoubtedly strengthened the hand of the upholders of *apartheid* and made them even less likely to modify their policy. As far as can be told, the Government of the Union of South Africa continues stubbornly on a suicidal course that will lead ultimately (barring the grace of God) to a blood bath that will make all Africa's present troubles seem mild.

The latest instance of this attitude is the banning in the Union of the book by the Bishop of Johannesburg describing the Sharpeville shooting of 1960. (*Shooting at Sharpeville*, by Ambrose Reeves, Houghton Mifflin, 142 pages, \$3.50.) Having exiled Bishop Reeves himself, it is now only fitting that the Government refuse entry to his book.

It is not surprising that this book should be banned. It is, admittedly, a case for the prosecution against the police in the killing of 67 Africans and the wounding of nearly 200 more. Bishop Reeves contends that an essentially peaceful crowd was fired on by the police without provocation and in truly brutal manner and that the Government has shown no remorse that this happened. It is his further contention that this was not an isolated incident but a natural result of the Government's use of the police force to enforce policies of which the majority of the nation's inhabitants do not approve. It was, in short, the action of a police state.

Let it be said at the outset that the bishop proves his case as to the events. He marshals his facts and testimony in a clear and convincing manner. To read the testimony of some of the witnesses at the inquiry investigating the shooting is to catch a glimpse of what hell it is to be an African living in the Union.

Interestingly enough, what clinches the case against the police are the photographs made before, during and after the shooting by news photographers. Photographs can be misleading. (It can be very difficult, for example, to decide what emotion is being displayed without knowing the facts of a situation.) Nevertheless, these photographs destroy the police account of the shooting. In addition, they are heartbreakingly documents.

Where Bishop Reeves does not do so well is in placing Sharpeville in context. Without a knowledge of South African politics (most particularly, African politics), it is hard to understand Sharpe-

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ville's significance. Why were the police so jittery? Did the bulk of the Africans stay home from work voluntarily or were they coerced into doing so?

The pass demonstrations, of which Sharpeville was a part, were not only a struggle between Africans and the Government but also a struggle between the older, more moderate leaders of the African National Congress and the younger, more extreme dissidents of the Pan-African Congress. The question of who wins that struggle is most important.

The leadership of the African National Congress has been strongly non-violent. It has been most chary of unleashing racial warfare. Partly this has been due to the leadership of Chief Luthuli. A product of mission schools, he is a distinguished Christian who has always sought both justice and reconciliation.

The most outstanding white opponents of the Government have also been notable Christians. Bishop Reeves himself, Trevor Huddleston, Alan Paton, Archbishop de Blank—the nature of their fight in the Union has been religious. Their ultimate and stated convictions stem directly from their Christian faith. (The Government and the Dutch Reformed churches used to claim that *apartheid* stemmed directly from their Christian faith, but the churches, at least, have changed their minds.)

What seems apparent to many Africans about this leadership, white and black, is that their struggle is not succeeding, and they wonder whether more drastic steps are not needed. It is no comfort to them to read in the New York and London liberal press what great men these leaders are. They know that already. What they want is justice soon.

This struggle is as important to the Sharpeville story as the police brutality and it helps to make the brutality a little more understandable. It is not enough to condemn the supporter of *apartheid*; we must understand him as well. The longer we think of the white South African as a monster, the worse things will get, since white South Africans already feel that they are slandered and misrepresented to the outside world.

Bishop Reeves has not chosen to tell this background story and one regrets it. Still, the story he tells is true and it is horrifying. After each incident such as Sharpeville, the famous words of Msimangu in Alan Paton's *Cry The Beloved Country* clang with a more prophetic and ominous sound: ". . . I have one great fear in my heart, that one day when they turn to loving they will find we are turned to hating." When the Africans in the Union do turn to hating, the world will stand aghast. If they do, it will be a failure of Christian attempts at reconciliation.

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Sociological analysis provides a close view of one country's experience of the problems of political independence, as Nigerians prepared to take control of their country last October.

#### AFRICA TODAY—AND TOMORROW

John Hatch. Praeger Paperback. 289 pp. \$1.75.

The history and background of the African peoples and the complexities of the new order that has arisen in their midst, are treated briefly but comprehensively in this useful book.

#### WILL DEMOCRACY WORK IN AFRICA?

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The first Chief Minister of Tanganyika upholds a one-party system as "democratic" for newly created African states and distinguishes the African's "sense of community" from Communist sentiments.

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
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